Part 2 of the Artist Toolkit. Part 1 covered what marketing that makes a business succeed is, and what to do. This part is about the thinking behind it: the mindset that matters most for producing results.

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In the autumn of 2025, Gen Z — people born roughly between the late 1990s and 2010 — took to the streets around the world. In Nepal a social-media ban sent young people out, and the prime minister resigned. In Madagascar, protests over power and water cuts went all the way to a change of government. The same generation moved in the same months in Indonesia, the Philippines, Peru and Morocco. The wave didn't stop in 2026; this autumn it has moved to Europe — France, Spain, Germany, Albania. In Japan, it didn't happen.

To be precise, it isn't that Japan has no demonstrations. I've been to some myself. In the spring of 2026, rallies against constitutional revision and sending the Self-Defense Forces abroad were held in front of the Diet and at Osaka Station, and on Constitution Memorial Day some 50,000 people, by the organisers' count, gathered in a Tokyo park, with young faces noticeably among them. But that was young people joining an agenda the older generations have carried for decades. A protest by Gen Z, for Gen Z, on Gen Z's own agenda — Japan doesn't have one.

Two reasons

I think there are two main reasons. One is the mood: in Japan, demonstrating is itself seen as a bad thing to do. School doesn't teach you that objecting to things is good. The mood has a history. The way Japan’s student movements of the 1960s and 70s ended — remembered as extreme, a nuisance, bad for your job prospects — left a long aftereffect. When a student group stood in front of the Diet in 2015, it was dismissed as “trying too hard.” Elsewhere a demonstration is one ordinary form of political participation; in Japan it still sits slightly outside the lines.
The other is numbers: Japan's young are far fewer than its old. The young know very well that they can't win on the street by headcount.

Numbers

The two reasons are connected rather than separate. The countries where the protests caught fire are young. By the UN's estimates (World Population Prospects 2024, figures for 2026), the median age is 19 in Madagascar, 26 in Nepal, 27 in the Philippines, and around 30 in Indonesia, Peru and Morocco. Japan's is 50, the second-highest in the world. The sheer number of people who could fill a street is different, and so is the size of the backlash when politics puts the young last.

A side that knows it can't win by numbers goes for exit rather than voice: not voting, leaving the country, earning alone instead of through a company. In the framework the economist Albert Hirschman set out in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Japan's young have chosen exit, quite clearly. I don't think that's apathy. It's arithmetic.

Triggers

The triggers differ too. Gen Z protests abroad were set off by a sense of a future being taken away — a social-media ban, pension reform, tax rises, high youth unemployment. In France, at the end of September 2026, high-school students in the Paris suburbs blockaded their schools over crumbling buildings and overcrowded classrooms; the blockades spread to lycées and universities across the country, and by November they had joined up with opposition to the government's education reforms and a general strike. There, the condition of education itself was the trigger.

Japan has a labour shortage, and young people find jobs easily. It isn't that there's no discontent; it takes the shape of "take-home pay is low" and "social insurance costs too much" — but for a generation that has never known a boom, this is simply normal. Public safety and public services work, at least on the surface. So the discontent is hard to feel.

One person at a time

So I don't think the quiet of Japan's young necessarily means they've given up on everything. Instead of taking to the streets, they keep choosing to step away, move on, earn on their own. But those are choices made one person at a time; they don't gather, become a movement, or shift anything large.

In 2011 the sociologist Noritoshi Furuichi wrote, in The Happy Youth of a Desperate Country, that the young of a country with nothing to hope for are the ones most likely to say they're satisfied with life as it is. The young people in that book are now in their late thirties, and the generation after them grew up knowing no other Japan. When the Nippon Foundation asked 17-to-19-year-olds in 2022 whether they believed their own actions could change their country or society, 26.9% in Japan said yes. In the United States it was 58.5%, in South Korea 61.5%, in India 78.9%.

They haven't given up on everything — but perhaps no young person in Japan believes that an individual can change a big government or a big organisation.

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The word "marketing" covers a lot of ground, and it is often used with the wrong idea of what it means.

One reason may be that it is hard to find a concise explanation of what marketing that makes a business succeed actually is.

So here it is, from me. I have led marketing at IT (SaaS) companies, from Japanese and global startups to listed companies, and launched the marketing function at the Japan office of a global IT company. Today I run businesses of my own and advise others on marketing, consumer and B2B alike, across industries. Below, I cover:

1. The concepts

   • What is marketing that makes a business succeed?

   • What to do, and how

   • The essential mindset

2. What artists can actually do

   • Which tools and programs to use, and how

   • What thinking to base it on

   • How to run marketing that makes the business succeed, in a realistic setup that still leaves room for making the work

1. The concepts may feel a little difficult at first. They will make sense later, so a quick read-through is enough.

1. For a company or a sole proprietor, what is "marketing that makes the business succeed"?

• Grasping the following, and how they change, accurately, then setting priorities flexibly and acting on them as the situation changes

  • The market

  • Competitors

  • Your own business (assets such as customer data, strengths and weaknesses, organisation, resources, the business plan, and so on)

    • ※ What does "grasp accurately" mean?

      • Not from your own point of view: qualitative and quantitative information from the customer's point of view

      • Based on an objective view that puts what you "should" do ahead of what you "want" to do

    • ※ If the market does not exist yet, you should start by creating it, but that gets complicated, so it is left out this time

In short…

• Unless you grasp the above accurately, it is impossible to plan a marketing strategy or any concrete measures

2. When executing marketing measures, what to do and how

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On 27 November 2025, HUMAN MADE listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s Growth Market. The brand was started in 2016 by NIGO — the designer who created A BATHING APE in the 1990s — and its shares opened at ¥3,440, nearly ten percent above the offer price.

The company’s stated purpose is “CULTIVATE CULTURE.” Its disclosure documents put it this way: to grow culture into a creative industry that represents Japan, following manga, anime and games. A fashion brand had volunteered itself for the IP business — intellectual property, meaning assets like characters and works that can be held, licensed and multiplied as rights.

The IP turn came before the listing

In January 2021, NIGO brought in Rehito Hatoyama as director and chief strategy officer. Hatoyama had been a managing director at Sanrio, where he took the Hello Kitty licensing business global. NIGO’s brief to him was: “Make HUMAN MADE big, the way you made Hello Kitty global at Sanrio.” The management team, in other words, was assembled on the premise that culture would be run as IP.

In May 2024, HUMAN MADE made Rei Matsunuma — formerly head of Uniqlo’s UT business — CEO and COO, and NIGO moved to a purely creative role. WWDJAPAN framed the arrangement as a question: how does a brand built on one man’s taste continue as a company if, hypothetically, he isn’t there? Revenue for the year to January 2025 was ¥11.2 billion, with an operating margin of 28 percent. Those are the numbers of a licensing company more than a clothing company.

The same summer, in Paris and Tokyo

Ramdane Touhami is a French-born creative director. Since the 1990s he has launched a string of clothing and fragrance brands, and in 2021 he and his wife sold Officine Universelle Buly — the old Paris apothecary they had revived — to LVMH. He now runs a shop called WORDS, SOUNDS, COLORS & SHAPES, in Paris and in Tokyo.

From 1 July to 31 August 2026 he ran the “24-HOUR PROPOSITION PROJECT.” One T-shirt design a day, on sale for twenty-four hours only. Sixty-two days, sixty-two designs. He gave eighteen studios in Paris, Munich, Tokyo and elsewhere a single theme — mountains — borrowed the rights to each design for twenty-four hours, took orders, and hand-printed every shirt in his own Paris workshop.

A personal name rather than a house name; a daily update rather than a collection; rights borrowed rather than owned. This too looks like an experiment in how to handle IP.

Touhami had resale in mind from the start. He built a way for anyone who missed a shirt to contact the buyer and ask to take it off their hands. In his own words, “like trading cards.” Make it limited, sell it out, let the price rise on the secondary market. That is HUMAN MADE’s engine exactly. And after the project ended, all sixty-two designs stayed up on the site.

Where the two of them are going

How do the two see what comes next?

HUMAN MADE’s CEO, Rei Matsunuma, said this in a 2025 interview: “More and more of the brand’s fans don’t know who NIGO is. Clothing has a short history in Japan, so a brand can end with a person’s lifetime. In a sense, growing beyond NIGO’s presence is where the brand’s growth lies.” The company he named as the one to learn from was LVMH.

Make the brand a structure that outlasts the person. That is the reason for the listing, and everything since follows from it: the three-floor flagship that opened in Harajuku in September 2026 (planned at ¥2–3 billion a year in sales), Shanghai in spring 2027, New York after that, and a plan for “at least one flagship per country.” The June announcement that HUMAN MADE would make UNDERCOVER — the brand of NIGO’s friend Jun Takahashi — a subsidiary is, in the company’s words, a step in “expanding the brand portfolio.”

Touhami, in a May 2026 interview with the FT, described his work in one line: “I create institutions.” The daily T-shirt ended after two months, but his shop WORDS, SOUNDS, COLORS & SHAPES is a platform rather than a brand, and inside it sit his own label (Die Drei Berge), an outdoor range linking Tokyo and Paris (A Young Hiker), a stationery line reviving the paper letter (Papier Royal), and a programme of archive publishing and exhibitions. He won’t list on any exchange. But what he’s doing — building something that keeps going after he’s gone — is what HUMAN MADE is doing.

Where Japanese fashion businesses are now

Japan’s best-known names abroad are probably Comme des Garçons, Yohji Yamamoto and Issey Miyake. Beyond them there are younger designers showing in Paris, brands stocked by select shops around the world, and independent labels that sell directly to their customers and build their own communities. Uniqlo was born here too. All of that is remarkable. But a fashion company that has gone public and then set out to run itself as IP — expanding on several fronts at once, by strategy — is, as far as I know, a first (Uniqlo is a mass-market manufacturer-retailer, and HUMAN MADE’s own disclosures place themselves in a different category).

Harajuku street fashion started in the 1990s. Now it has IP — the thing Japan is best at — on its side. How it builds a business from here is worth watching.

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Suppose AI, and the robotics that follow it, keep improving exponentially. Then what we’ve called “work” disappears, and people might get to live more humanly than ever. The optimistic version, anyway.

By “humanly” I mean a phrase the philosopher Koichiro Kokubun borrows at the opening of The Ethics of Boredom and Leisure (2011): a life needs roses, not only bread. Bread is what you need to stay alive — food, a roof, the wages that pay for them. Roses are what make being alive worth it — music, ornament, travel, a night with other people. Kokubun takes the contrast from a lecture by the English designer William Morris (1879), who argued that people should work not merely to eat but to decorate their lives with roses.

Right now most of us are tied up with bread. Take that away, and we turn to the roses.

Not everyone, though

At the same time, I suspect people who don’t have roses — or can’t make them — will end up chasing romance, porn, games and drugs. People who do will live something like a Roman citizen’s life: culture, all day.

What happens to the system

Without work, prices change and so does capitalism itself. Do we end up with something closer to a state-managed, communist-ish society? Probably not — people are foolish. There will still be people who want to display power, and inequality will still exist. But the floor may well be higher than it is now.

What gets stronger

So what gets stronger is this: things with a narrative (the background, more than the thing itself), offline, human, and available only then.

Offline matters for a simple reason: what AI can make cheaply and endlessly is whatever lives on a screen. Text, images, music, someone to talk to — as long as it’s digital, the cost of copying it falls to almost nothing, and people don’t pay much for what costs nothing to copy. What’s left is what can’t be copied: the fact that on one night, in one room, you were there with those people. You can’t take it home, and it won’t happen again tomorrow.

Matching people with people stays in demand for the same reason. Until now, people have met each other half-automatically, through companies and workplaces. When work goes, so does that machinery. To meet anyone, someone has to make a room, invite people, and put them together — and that someone will be a person with a face, not an AI.

In short: here and now matters. Experiences that can’t be repeated matter.

A new way to measure a person

Once people are no longer labour, you can’t evaluate them as labour. You need another axis. That’s where narrative comes in. Not what you do, but what story you’re in.

And yet, people are foolish

In any era, people fight and reach for power. I used to think wars wouldn’t happen if every country had abundant resources. I no longer think so. Wars happen out of boredom and a hunger for status.

Without roses

So, where you can, keep a sensible distance from work-as-we-know-it, and shift toward making and enjoying culture. I suspect that’s the richer way to live — because we can’t live without roses in the first place, and the world we’re heading into is one where enjoying them is said to be what richness means.

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From 28 October 2026, culture officials from more than forty-five cities gather in Tokyo for three days of the World Cities Culture Summit. From 4 November, Art Week Tokyo returns for its fifth edition with a record fifty-five venues.

In September of the same year, Robert Huggins, an economic geographer at Cardiff University, published the World Art Cities Index 2026 — fifty cities ranked on their capacity to make, sell and show art. Tokyo came 15th of fifty.

Tokyo on the index

Out of fifty cities:

• Overall 15th (New York 1st, London 2nd)

• Market 7th / Production 16th / Consumption 28th

• Per capita, 48th

  • The author’s note: Tokyo’s population is huge, so dividing by it pushes the city down

What the index counts is the number of galleries, museums and art schools; the number of art fairs and biennials (the big international exhibitions held every two years); and the number of “recognised” artists — recognised meaning they appear in the British magazine ArtReview’s annual Power 100 ranking of influence, or have shown at biennials.

So the index doesn’t measure how good the art is. It measures how visible a city is to the art world’s institutions. The author says so himself: the rankings are “indicative, not definitive.”

Tokyo belongs to neither story

The index sorts the fifty cities into three groups: long-established centres (Core), regional hubs, and the periphery. Tokyo is Core, alongside New York, London, Paris, Berlin, Los Angeles, Düsseldorf and Milan.

So when the English-language art world talks about “the rise of Asian art cities,” Tokyo isn’t in the story.

• Artists from emerging Asian cities in the Power 100: one in 2005 → twenty-four in 2025 (Hong Kong, Shanghai, Beijing, Seoul, Singapore, Mumbai, Delhi)

• Tokyo artists in the Power 100 over the same twenty years: seven entries in total (1.4 percent)

  • The report’s verdict: “essentially flat throughout”

Tokyo isn’t counted among the rising, and it doesn’t stand out among the reigning. On this index, it falls between two stories.

The reason is in Japan’s own numbers

Since fiscal 2022, Japan’s Agency for Cultural Affairs has surveyed the domestic art market every year. The stated reason: the Japanese art market “is not fairly evaluated at home or abroad.” The economist doing the counting is Clare McAndrew — the same person behind the Art Basel & UBS global report. From the 2025 edition:

• Japan’s share of the global market: 1 percent

  • Roughly unchanged for five years

• Dealers and galleries: over 2,080

  • 59 percent in Tokyo. Five percent with an overseas base

• Art-fair sales as a share of gallery revenue: 19 percent, below the global figure

  • The reason given: neither Art Basel nor Frieze holds a fair in Japan

• 93 percent of transactions under $50,000

One conclusion follows.

• Made in Tokyo, sold in Tokyo — but the price is settled in New York and London

  • Example: Yayoi Kusama ranked 6th worldwide by auction sales in 2024

    • Sixteen percent of that was transacted in Japan

    • Her top hammer price in Japan: ¥241.5 million

    • At Christie’s New York: $5.6 million (about ¥834 million)

  • Example: Hokusai — 4 percent transacted in Japan

  • The WACI report itself says production disperses across the world while monetisation concentrates in a few cities. Tokyo is the textbook case

  • But the index files Tokyo as Core, so it isn’t treated as one of the cities that make the work and watch the price get set elsewhere

The form Tokyo chose

Mami Kataoka, director of the Mori Art Museum, calls Art Week Tokyo “post-art fair.” There is no fair. Free buses link museums and galleries, and the whole city is the venue. On the index’s “number of art fairs” line, Tokyo’s flagship event never registers.

The state doubled its bet on culture. It points the other way

The same summer, the Agency for Cultural Affairs filed its budget request for the coming year:

• Agency budget: ¥107.3 billion → requested ¥233.5 billion (2.2 times)

• The single biggest new line: “creator development support,” ¥64.9 billion

  • For manga, anime, games, live action and music

  • Tied to a government target of ¥20 trillion in overseas content sales by 2033

• Heritage preservation: ¥93.6 billion

• The line closest to contemporary art, “global development of Japanese art and culture”: ¥1.1 billion, up from ¥0.9 billion

The new money went to manga and anime (which the index doesn’t count) and to heritage (which is neither making, selling nor showing). Contemporary art got almost none of it.

What 15th means

In a piece called The Sign Flip: Money, Art, and Japan’s Two Verdicts, I wrote about a line in Japan: people who make pop culture get celebrated; people who make contemporary art, far less so. This index and this budget are that line turned into numbers.

A Tokyo artist’s work gets its price in New York. The state’s money goes to manga and anime. So “15th” doesn’t mean Tokyo’s art is the fifteenth best. It means the price isn’t set here, and the state is counting something else. Those two things, together.

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Most people in Japan don’t seem especially anxious about AI. Someone generates a low-quality AI image of a dish, cooks the real thing to match it, posts it on X, and it goes viral.

AI-generated images of food have a peculiar creepiness to them, and a few people on X went as far as cooking the dishes to match.

Plenty of people call ChatGPT “Chappy” — what you get when you clip “Chat GPT” the Japanese way, and it ends up sounding like a character’s name; it was one of the thirty nominees for Japan’s 2025 buzzword of the year.

The story currently loud in the United States — superintelligence ending humanity, a plot not far from the Tower of Babel (the Old Testament tale of humans building a tower to heaven to become gods, and drawing God’s anger) — is rarely heard here.

Why? I think there are three layers to it.

No trespass to punish

The West’s archetypes of AI fear are the golem (in Jewish legend, a figure made of clay and brought to life) and Frankenstein. Both are stories about a human seizing the creator’s prerogative and being punished for it. The premise is that making a soul is trespass.

Shinto, Japan’s everyday religion — mindset may be the better word — holds that yaoyorozu no kami, “eight million gods,” dwell in all things; the number means “countless,” and it covers mountains, rivers and tools alike. So that trespass doesn’t exist in the first place.

Imagining a soul in anything shaped like a living creature comes easily to people everywhere; in Japan, to my eye, it’s especially pronounced. In the logic of tsukumogami — tools that acquire a spirit after long years of use, a folk belief going back to the Muromachi period — an object gaining a soul is simply natural. There are memorial rites for worn-out sewing needles (pushed into tofu or konnyaku to thank them for their work, on the eighth of February or December) and for dolls (returned to a temple or shrine when their time is done).

In January 2015, Kōfukuji temple in Isumi, Chiba began group funerals for discontinued aibo — Sony’s robot dog, launched in 1999, discontinued in 2006, with repair support ending in 2014. The priest, Fumihiko Ōi, took it on, and from the second service the altar held pliers, nippers and testers instead of flowers and fruit. That things and machines each carry a spirit is simply ordinary here.

Not control, but preparedness

Western AI safety assumes controllability. “We must align it” — alignment being the field that tries to keep an AI’s goals in line with human intent — comes bundled with “it can be controlled, it should be controlled,” which is exactly what makes a future where control fails an unbearable nightmare.

In Japan, with those eight million gods in the background, the idea that humans stand above natural forces and can bring disasters to heel was never strong. For most things beyond one’s own power, the common posture is: it can’t be helped; go with it.

Disaster preparedness is the same. What comes, comes. Prepare, absorb, live alongside it.

Faced with the same uncontrollable force, the Christian reflex says stop it; the Shinto reflex asks how to live with it — Toward anything beyond human understanding, Japanese people tend not to count it as controllable in the first place.

The endings of the stories show it. Born in Christian-majority places: HAL 9000, the ship’s computer in 2001: A Space Odyssey, is disconnected; the Terminator is destroyed; Ex Machina ends in annihilation (there it’s the humans who are erased, but either way one side wipes out the other). Born in Japan: in Ghost in the Shell, Motoko Kusanagi — a cyborg with a fully artificial body — merges with an artificial life form.

Industry and institutions

Since the bubble burst in 1990, Japan’s headlines have mostly been dark — economic decline, a shrinking population. People now in their prime never saw the boom years. As The Happy Youth of a Desperate Country (sociologist Noritoshi Furuichi’s 2011 book, on a generation with little hope for the future and high life satisfaction anyway) describes, many don’t hold much hope to begin with.

Confucian deference to elders — the Chinese-born ethic that puts respect for seniors at the centre of social order — runs deep, which is part of why new technology spreads more slowly here. Perhaps that’s why, in business, as far as I can see, the industries actually nervous about AI are tech and IP-driven companies; the rest, feeling no impact yet, feel little threat either. Or perhaps they’re just keeping their eyes shut.....

Chappy, again today

Peter Thiel’s “Antichrist” essay in First Things — the PayPal and Palantir co-founder arguing that the Antichrist will arrive as a world government that exploits fear of AI and climate to centralise power; even the side that rejects doom talks about AI in biblical terms — made the rounds a while ago. To most people in Japan, the idea simply doesn’t land.

Today they’ll call it Chappy again, treat it a bit like a pet, make strange things with it, and not worry much about the big questions — because we feel we are part of the world, and the world is not something humanity can control.

From Tokyo, we read culture, support the people who make it, and grow new ways of seeing with people around the world. That is what we’re here for.

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In February 2025, the Beatles’ “Now and Then” won the Grammy for Best Rock Performance. It is an arrangement built on a cassette John Lennon recorded at home in New York in the late 1970s: piano and voice, nothing else. The other three had in fact tried to finish it in the 1990s, but the technology of the time couldn’t pull his voice out from under the piano, and they gave up. Then, in 2021, a machine-learning tool built by Peter Jackson’s team separated the voice from the piano; Paul McCartney and Ringo Starr added their parts, and the song was released in 2023. McCartney has said it again and again: nothing was synthesised. The voice was separated, not made.

In September 2024, SOPHIE’s self-titled album was released. When she died in January 2021 it was nearly complete; her brother Benny Long, who had worked beside her on it for years, finished the rest.

In June 2022, three songs disappeared from Spotify and Apple Music — tracks from Michael (2010), the first album released after Michael Jackson’s death. For years his mother, his children and others had doubted that the voice on them was his. The estate that manages his music and Sony said the removal had nothing to do with authenticity; it was “the simplest and best way to move beyond the conversation.” Jackson’s posthumous music is held by an estate run by the executors named in his will; in 2024 Sony bought half of the catalogue for more than $600 million, and the two now run it together.

On New Year’s Eve 2019, on NHK’s Kōhaku song contest (Japan’s biggest annual TV music event), Hibari Misora — the biggest female star singer of postwar Japan, who died in 1989 — sang a new song. The voice was built by AI; the lyrics were ones she had never sung. Her family had agreed. The reaction split anyway: “I got to hear her again” and “this is desecration,” side by side on the same night.

This is what I keep snagging on. Using the voice data of a singer who has died to release a new song — is that all right? And whose voice is it, exactly?

What Hiroki Azuma wrote

A book from 2001 helps here: Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals, by the philosopher Hiroki Azuma (English translation by Jonathan E. Abel and Shion Kono, University of Minnesota Press, 2009). Using otaku anime consumption as his example, Azuma wrote this.

People used to receive a work as a single story — an author, a beginning and an end, something it wanted to say. In the nineties that changed. People began pulling only the elements they liked out of the “database” behind the work. A character could be broken down into parts — cat ears, a maid outfit — and once you had the parts, you could build the next character without an author. Azuma called this “database consumption.”

Today’s version is the Spotify playlist. Chill, Rainy Day, Focus. You take the element — a feeling — without registering whose song it is. Fewer people listen to an album as an album; more listen by tag. Azuma wrote this before TikTok and before Spotify existed.

Azuma described the consumer. IP is the owner’s side of the same thing

But Azuma was writing about how people receive. The database of 2001 was something fans had built on their own; it belonged to nobody.

What I’ve been sensing lately — call it IP-ification — is the same phenomenon seen from the other side. If something can be broken into elements, each element can be owned. If it can be owned, it can be run. And the people who run it are not consumers but whoever holds the rights.

The easiest rights for a third party to run are those attached to an artist who has died. No new work. No broken contracts. No ageing. No objections. Michael Jackson — the moonwalk, the white glove, that voice, the red jacket — is a bundle of elements you can consume completely without him. The estate and Sony keep him in content after death so that today’s teenagers meet him, and so that those teenagers, grown up, will buy him again as the sound of back then. Nostalgia, planted in advance.

The reason isn’t mysterious. Not “we can’t imagine a future” — just that it’s easy. Building recognition for someone new costs more than recycling what everyone already knows.

From use to inheritance

Artists have been used by power in every era — Rome, the aristocracy, wartime propaganda. That’s a sad story. But I don’t think “the artist won because the name survived.” What survived is the work. The person wasn’t repaid.

What’s changed, I think, is the form of the use. It used to be commissioning: at least the artist was in the room. Now it’s holding. When Hibari Misora is made to sing a new song, she isn’t at the table.

Line up the four cases from the top of this piece by how much the artist was actually present, and you get a ladder. Lennon sang and recorded it himself; the other three, as far as we’re told, only made the recording audible. SOPHIE had nearly finished the music, and the brother who had been working beside her completed it. On the three Jackson tracks, nobody could be sure the voice was his at all. For Hibari Misora, neither the voice nor the words had ever come from her. Each step down, the artist is further from the table. The yardstick for what counts as “her work” seems to be that distance, not the law.

Rights: what permission doesn’t cover

The law, briefly (I’m not a lawyer, and this was checked before publication). In Japan, a voice as such isn’t protected by copyright. The right to control commercial use of one’s name and likeness — publicity rights — derives, in case law, from the personal rights of a living person, and the prevailing view is that it doesn’t extend to the dead. So the voice of someone who has died is close to a legal blank in Japan; in practice, the family and the rights holders negotiate. The United States varies by state; Tennessee passed the ELVIS Act in 2024, explicitly covering AI-generated voice.

Even with the law settled, though, I doubt the snag goes away.

Re-releasing a recording the singer once approved is one thing. Making her say words she never said, in her own voice, is another. For the second, “consent” can’t even be formed — she died before the technology existed.

And the family’s permission doesn’t fill that gap. When the Anthony Bourdain documentary Roadrunner (2021) used an AI version of his voice, the director said the estate had approved; his ex-wife said otherwise. Nobody could answer who gets to speak for the dead. With Hibari Misora, the family had agreed, and the reaction split anyway. What people were objecting to wasn’t the absence of permission.

Ownership and inheritance can’t be separated from how we see death

This is the part I most want to think about. The very idea of inheriting a voice as property assumes one particular view of death.

Japanese law already contains a different assumption. Article 897 of the Civil Code: genealogies, ritual implements and graves pass outside the ordinary estate, to whoever presides over the family rites. They aren’t divided among heirs. The law itself concedes that what belongs to mourning can’t be split by the logic of property.

Is a voice property, or is it closer to the family altar? Practice treats it as property. But maybe the intuition that refuses is answering to the altar.

One more thing. Japanese mourning had forgetting built in. Japanese Buddhism has a custom of memorial services at set years after a death — the first, second, sixth, twelfth and so on — at which a priest is called to pray for the dead. The last of these is the thirty-third memorial, held in the thirty-second year, and in most schools that is where the individual rites end and the dead dissolve into the collective “ancestors” — the form the folklorist Kunio Yanagita described in About Our Ancestors (1946). Preserving a proper name forever was never part of the design.

What’s happening now runs the other way. Grave closures, tree burials, scattering ashes: the remains are being let go. Meanwhile voices and faces are managed as assets and run with no end date. We’re releasing the body and keeping the data.

Letting go stopped being automatic

Technology has made feelings we ought to release harder to release. More precisely: letting go stopped being automatic.

Things used to disappear on their own. Photographs faded, letters got lost, a voice lost its detail in memory. The rate of decay was the rate of mourning. Digital doesn’t decay, so time no longer does the work. Deleting the chat history of someone who has died, closing the account — these became jobs someone has to decide to do.

But not being able to let go was always the human default. The thirty-third memorial isn’t a natural event; it’s a deadline people set, precisely because left alone we don’t let go. “Let’s end it here.” What broke isn’t the capacity. It’s the device.

Not who owns it. When it ends.

So maybe what’s needed isn’t a new right but an end date — the way copyright has a term — for voice data too. Design for when it ends, not for who owns it. The language of mourning, not the language of property.

Maybe making the dead sing a new song isn’t something to judge only on whether it’s right or wrong. The one thing I can say is that a system where “the family agreed” ends the conversation is dropping something. What it drops is the fact that the singer isn’t at the table — and the feelings of the people who knew her alive.

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Regardless of genre, I personally think there are three kinds of DJ. If you had to split them, that is. In practice, DJs don’t sort into three boxes. Every DJ carries all three of these, in different proportions. What follows describes the three ingredients.

• The bodybuilder. A set locked in advance, delivered at full intensity, with the DJ getting high on it and the room getting high watching. Closer to bodybuilding than to performance.

  • It’s the kind of big-room show deadmau5 described in 2012 when he wrote, himself included, that “we all hit play.”

• The craftsman. Reads the room, but hands and sound come first. Adjusts endlessly. The posture is closer to a sound engineer’s than a performer’s.

  • Jamaican sound systems — the street-corner rigs of stacked speakers that grew up in Kingston in the 1940s, and the crews that ran them — split the job into roles: the selector, who picked the records and read the crowd; the operator, who ran the speakers; the technician, who built and fixed the gear; and the MC on the mic. The craftsman descends from the gear side: operator and technician.

• The miko. Named for the shrine maiden of Japanese ritual — the attendant who serves as a vessel. Reads the energy of the room as it is right now and gives the people in it everything. Watches the hour and the arc of the whole party, adjusting all of it live. Takes the room over, in the good sense. Clears it.

  • Brewster and Broughton’s Last Night a DJ Saved My Life is often cited for tracing the DJ back to the shaman, from a time when dance and religion were close, and Larry Levan’s Paradise Garage has been described as a “Saturday Mass.” But miko may be the more accurate word. A shaman lets the spirit in and becomes the centre. A miko is the vessel, the channel. And at the same time, she is the lead — and she makes everyone on the floor a lead too.

Anime-song clubs and the miko

The miko type turns up in every genre, but Japan’s anikura — anime-song club nights — seem to have more of them. There, the floor arrives already the star. Calls, sing-alongs, otagei (the choreographed fan dances): a complete expressive repertoire, on the crowd’s side. The DJ’s job is to trigger it. There are bodybuilders here too, of course. But anikura runs on a philosophy of lift-the-floor-and-nothing-else-matters, and more often than not the DJ and the crowd are fans of the same thing, cheering for it together.

Yardsticks, and the balance of power

Obviously the yardstick changes with the organiser and the purpose of the party. A festival peak and six in the morning ask for different things. With the bodybuilder, the DJ tends to be the overwhelming lead, and the floor looks up. The craftsman and the miko are the lead too — but they share the lead with the floor. The balance of power is different from the start, which is why they can look less flashy next to the bodybuilder. None of this is a ranking. In front of ten thousand people, a pre-built bodybuilder set is probably what most people want. In a small room at six a.m., someone who can read the room like a miko tends to be what the night needs.

The rarest one

I’ve been to a lot of parties and raves, and I love all three. But personally, the DJ who has both the miko and the craftsman in them is the rarest, and a party with that DJ on is the best kind of night. I’m grateful they exist. If you’d like a night out like that in Tokyo — anikura or any other genre — try the Custom Japan Itinerary. If a DJ like that is playing, or a great party is on while you’re here, I’ll point you to it.

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Netflix’s Badly in Love (Japanese title Rabu Jōtō). Season one arrived on 9 December 2025, season two on 4 August 2026. Netflix’s own pitch: “Japan’s first yankii dating reality show, where love lives on the edge and tempers flare.” Season one reached #8 on Netflix’s Global Top 10 for non-English series and won Best Reality & Variety at the KISF 2026 Global OTT Awards. Yankii is the umbrella word for Japan’s delinquent youth culture — embroidered tokkōfuku jackets, modified motorcycles, and a code of loyalty and honour all its own. The cast includes a former biker-gang leader, people who have been through juvenile detention. I’ll say plainly that yankii style is cool. The embroidered tokkōfuku jackets, the code of loyalty, the ritual of the one-on-one fight. Which is exactly why something about this show kept catching.

The viewing frame

Shows about kyabajō and hosts — Japan’s paid-companionship nightlife, where staff sit beside customers, pour their drinks and keep the conversation going; women are kyabajō, men are hosts — come with a frame already attached: that business is “the night world,” a kind of fantasy, and for many viewers that builds in a distance. Badly in Love is different. What we are actually enjoying is the cast’s wounds — and the polished production makes that very hard to notice. That, I think, is the problem.

Many of the cast have been in trouble since childhood, and in most such cases the cause is environment and parents. Some have gone through the welfare system and juvenile detention and are still in trouble afterwards. The wound didn’t close even after the system got involved. If that is so, it is a failure of Japan’s welfare system — and it means the thing we’re enjoying is a wound that hasn’t healed.

Style and wound

Yankii aesthetics may be a repair technology, invented where care never arrived: a way of converting unrecognised pain into pride. Netflix’s own English copy credits season one’s success to its “raw, unpredictable depiction of human emotions,” and describes the cast as “rough-around-the-edges.” The Japanese copy goes further: “lives laid bare,” “100% purity.” The show isn’t selling the style. It’s selling what’s underneath it.

Art, fashion, style — these convert symptoms into work, and the conversion itself can help put a person back together. Reality TV doesn’t convert. It sells the symptom as a symptom.

Knowing what it is

It’s a reality show, so not all of it is real. But the way attachment shows up in these people is unmistakably raw. Looking down on it as something unclean is obviously wrong. Watching them as stars is fine. What I think we need is to hold one thing in mind while we watch: we are, in practice, enjoying someone’s unhealed wound. Those of us on the receiving end need to enjoy it knowing that. So this is the same psychology that has us reading conspiracy theories, or looking up the details of a crime even as we pray for the victims. That isn't a bad thing. Yankii culture and that style are cool. The cast, of course, are cool. But turning violence toward other people into something to worship — that, I think, is different. These are not people to be pitied. It's just that their wounds are fully exposed, and we'd do well to know that as we watch.

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Exploring Tokyo's layers — and the world's — and supporting the people who create them.

Tokyo tastes good wherever you go. That isn't hype; it's close to a structural fact. The city has led the world in Michelin stars for eighteen years running, with 170 starred restaurants in 2025, ahead of Paris's 142. But that's the least interesting number here. Stars measure the ceiling. Tokyo's real feat is the floor: even the cheapest places are good.

So the question worth asking isn't where to eat in Japan, or Tokyo. It's why Japan is so reliably, unreasonably good at food. The answer is twelve hundred years old, and it was never really about food.

The Average, Not the Peak

Every food city has a peak. Lima has its tasting menus, Copenhagen its foraged everything, and New York can buy almost anything with money — love excepted. What Tokyo has that no other city does is an average so high you could fall asleep on it.

A 500-yen (about $3) beef bowl is good. A 1,000-yen (about $7) bowl of ramen chosen at random is usually very good. The mid-range izakaya, the department-store basement, the highway rest stop: all of it clears a bar that would make a restaurant respectable in most Western capitals. The quality doesn't fade as the price drops.

Two forces hold that floor up.

The first: craftsmanship here was never reserved for craftsmen. In most countries, obsessive technique belongs to a small guild of top chefs, and everyday food gets everyday effort. In Japan the ethic spread everywhere. The part-timer calibrating the tempura station. The chain-store manual specifying the seconds of a noodle's bath. Perfecting one small thing, and then perfecting it again, is treated less like ambition than basic decency.

The second is the customer. Japanese diners may have the sharpest palates on earth. They notice the small difference — how the rice was cooked, how clear the broth runs — and they keep going back to the good ones. Cheap isn't an excuse here; it's its own category with its own standards. Word travels fast, about the good places and the bad alike. Put the two together, and the good places are the ones that naturally last.

The sharpness itself is the interesting part. It isn't natural. It was built, by a law almost nobody remembers.

The Ban

In 675 CE, Emperor Tenmu issued an edict banning the eating of meat: cattle, horses, dogs, monkeys, and chickens.

It's tempting to read this as deep religious feeling. It was closer to policy. Japan was assembling itself into a state, and Buddhism was the statecraft of the moment. Adopting its prohibition on killing signaled — to the court, and pointedly to Tang China (present-day China) — that this was a civilized, righteous nation. The ban was, in large part, diplomatic branding.

It was also economics. Cattle and horses were the tractors and trucks of the seventh century. Eat your ox and you've eaten your farm. Protecting draft animals protected the rice economy, the actual foundation of state power. "Don't eat the infrastructure" is not a spiritual teaching.

But laws have afterlives their authors never plan. Over centuries, the edict fused with the Shinto instinct that blood is pollution, kegare, and hardened from regulation into taboo. Eating four-legged animals became not illegal so much as unclean, unthinkable. What began as seventh-century industrial policy lasted until the Meiji government formally rehabilitated meat in 1872 and the emperor himself made a show of eating beef.

The Loopholes

Here's the thing about a 1,200-year ban: people never stop wanting meat. What Japan produced instead was twelve centuries of magnificent cheating.

Rabbits were reclassified as birds — long ears, they hop, therefore bird — which is why, to this day, rabbits in Japanese are counted with the bird counter: one wa, two wa. Whales and dolphins, being in the ocean, were filed under fish and eaten with enthusiasm. Wild boar became yama-kujira, "mountain whale," a phrase that does an impressive amount of legal work in four syllables. Venison became momiji, maple leaves; horse became sakura, cherry blossom; and by the Edo period there were specialist restaurants serving all of it under the sturdy alibi of kusuri-gui, "eating as medicine." Not dinner. Treatment.

Chicken, meanwhile, stayed taboo longer than most: the rooster announced the dawn and was considered sacred. A civilization that had talked itself into whale-as-fish drew the line at the bird in the yard.

For twelve centuries, Japan quietly built loophole upon loophole around its own law. That accumulation is what raised an exceptionally refined palate.

Umami as Engineering

Take away meat, and a problem remains: how do you make food satisfying without fat and flesh?

Japan's answer was to go small. Having set aside the obvious, cooks turned to the microscopic: the glutamates in kombu (dried kelp), the inosinates in katsuobushi (dried, shaved bonito — a fish), the guanylates in dried shiitake (a mushroom). Dashi is the stock built from these.

And the technique went further. Combine glutamate with inosinate and the perceived intensity doesn't add, it multiplies. Umami synergy is textbook food chemistry now; Japanese cooks worked it out empirically, as a whole population, centuries before anyone could explain why. Add the fermented seasonings — soy sauce, miso, mirin — and you have a cuisine that engineers depth where others reach for meat.

Shinto did its part. In a worldview where yaoyorozu no kami, eight million gods, inhabit every natural thing, an ingredient isn't raw material; it's a guest. The cook's job becomes not transformation but revelation: draw out the ingredient's strengths to the fullest.

The philosophy is clearest by comparison. Much of Asia cooks by addition: the wok's fire, the chili's heat, the market's momentum. It's thrilling, generous, alive. Japan cooks mostly by subtraction, drawing out the best of what the ingredient already is: control the temperature, control the water, strip away every stray note until only the signal is left. The care shows in the details — a takoyaki nudged around the hot iron so the heat reaches it evenly, or the exact moisture a soba shop watches over.

The Inherited Palate

Once the constraint lifted, that trained palate turned outward. Japan made omurice from the Western omelet, put the cutlet and curry of two different empires on one plate, and studied Chinese noodle soup closely, adding its own interpretation to create ramen. The same reflex that once perfected dashi now elevates whatever it touches: French pastry, Neapolitan pizza, third-wave coffee.

How to Eat Well Here — Price and Prestige Aside

The places I actually go, and the know-how for using this city like a local, live in Map & Tips — a full field guide with a curated Google Map, included only with the annual membership. Check the free samples, then go, and taste it for yourself.

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One afternoon I was listening to music made by Aum Shinrikyo — the doomsday cult that released sarin in the Tokyo subway in 1995, killing fourteen people and injuring thousands.

Let me state where I stand. I have no patience for any group that deliberately harms people — least of all Aum, which killed fourteen with sarin in the subway. That is not forgivable. A crime is a crime. What follows examines it from a different angle.

With that said, here is the fact I have to report: the music works. The so-called astral music the cult made for meditation — cheap synthesizers, endless repetition, structures no label would keep — functions, unmistakably, as trance music. Thirty years on, played to a listener who despises everything the group stood for, the machinery still runs.

That discomfort was the doorway into a question I couldn't put down. Why does cult music work? What is it actually doing? And why, when I lined up the answers, did they start describing my weekends?

Designed to Alter

Two things explain the strange potency of Aum's recordings. Neither is talent in the usual sense.

The first is the production environment. This was music made outside the market. No deadlines, no A&R, no test audiences, no reason to trim the eleven-minute drone to a radio-friendly four. Everything a commercial process would sand off is still attached. In that sense it sits on the same shelf as outsider art: work whose strangeness survived because nobody with power over it cared about your attention span.

The second is intent. This music wasn't written to be good. It was written to be effective, a tool for altering consciousness, built for repetitive playback inside practices that already included sleep deprivation and, we now know, drugs. Asking whether it's well-made is like judging a hypnotist's script as literature. It was tuned for trance, so it produces trance. The only surprise is that the tuning holds even after the doctrine is stripped away.

Seen that way, Aum's tapes join a very old lineage: Gregorian chant, the Sufi dhikr, gamelan trance ceremonies, and — we'll get there — four-on-the-floor techno at brutal volume. Religious music has always been body-manipulation technology. Cult music misuses it.

The Discography of Belief

Once you start listening to cult discographies, a pattern emerges that beats any exposé: the music can't lie. Doctrine can be laundered for the public. A sound can't. Whatever the group was actually selling comes out in the genre.

Scientology made albums. Space Jazz (1982) was L. Ron Hubbard's soundtrack to his own novel: cutting-edge Fairlight, name musicians, the air of a vanity project with no budget ceiling. But the truly revealing artifact is "We Stand Tall" (1990), an internal anthem that later leaked. Soaring key changes, group vocals, the exact emotional grammar of a corporate awards ceremony or a soft-drink commercial. Nothing like mystical ecstasy.

Peoples Temple cut a gospel record, He's Able, in 1973, five years before Jonestown. It is, genuinely, a good gospel-soul album: tight band, powerful voices, real warmth. That's what makes it the heaviest listen in this whole field. The community's promise — belonging, dignity, interracial solidarity — was real enough to sing, and over nine hundred people followed that warmth to Guyana. Knowing the ending, the opening welcome is almost impossible to hear.

The Source Family, a 1970s Los Angeles commune, recorded psychedelic rock as morning ritual, their leader improvising over the band at dawn. Collectors prize those records today not as curiosities but as legitimately good free-form psych. And the Osho movement commissioned meditation music from Deuter, a first-rate ambient composer. Aum's project done competently, which is its own unsettling thought.

Line them up. Aum is trance induction. Scientology is corporate triumph. Peoples Temple is communal warmth. The Source Family is freeform abandon. Four groups, four genres. In every case, the music's genre is a more honest tell than anything the group said about itself. You can spin a doctrine for years; the sound gives it away in minutes.

The Machinery

Music is only one part of the belief-machine. Map the rest, and you can see where the music sits.

There's a useful division hiding in the logistics. Some influence tools are distributable: music, video, books. Things you can mail, broadcast, or stream to strangers. Others require enclosure: incense, lighting, sleep schedules, diet. You can't post a smell. Scent is neurologically privileged; it runs to the emotional brain more directly than any other sense, which is why nearly every religion burns something. But it only works on people already in the room. So the pattern: distributable media recruit; enclosure media retain and deepen. Aum's music was its outbound signal, sold in shops and played on streets. The physiological program waited inside.

And the physiological layer is the strong one. Sleep deprivation dulls exactly the faculties you'd need to argue back; critical thinking lives in the prefrontal cortex, the first thing exhaustion powers down. Controlled overbreathing produces tingling, euphoria, dissociation on demand; certain "dynamic meditations" are, mechanically, guided hyperventilation. Restricted diets alter mood and clarity. Music matters here as a multiplier: a drone that's mildly hypnotic on a rested listener is overwhelming on someone forty-eight hours awake. The tapes I heard were designed for people in that state. I only got the carrier wave.

The sociology delivers the real anticlimax, and it's worth stating because it dismantles the horror-movie version. Decades of research on who actually joins these groups keep finding the same thing. The strongest predictor isn't doctrine, charisma, or music. It's friendship: whether people you trust are already inside. Classic fieldwork found conversion followed social bonds far more than belief. Later studies found that of the people who attended one famous new religion's recruitment workshops, only about one in ten joined, and most of those left of their own accord within a couple of years. The irresistible-brainwashing-machine image doesn't survive contact with the data. The outer layer of any such group runs on the most ordinary force there is: belonging. The coercion is reserved for the core, and the outer layer rarely sees it.

Hold that architecture in mind. An open, warm periphery running on friendship. A sealed core running on physiology. And music carrying the signal between them.

The Club Checklist

Somewhere in the research, a stray thought moved in and stayed: this is describing club culture.

Run the checklist against a serious techno weekend. Berlin is the reference implementation.

• Sleep deprivation: Friday midnight to Monday morning.

• Repetitive audio engineered for altered states: that's simply the definition of techno.

• Chemical initiation.

• Windowless rooms, no clocks: standard architecture.

• Information sealing: the camera stickers over your phone lenses.

• In-group language and thought-terminating clichés: "if you know, you know."

• Costly signaling: this one needs a paragraph.

The door at Berghain is famous for rejecting people without explanation, for being unbuyable, for standards nobody can state. As user experience, it's absurd. As social technology, it's precision-engineered, and it's the same mechanism documented in nineteenth-century religious communes, where researchers found that the stricter the demands, the longer the commune survived. High entry costs filter out the uncommitted and make everyone who paid them value the inside more. The bouncer isn't gatekeeping a bar. He's administering a sacrament of costly signaling, and it works exactly as well as it did on the Shakers.

Even the architecture rhymes, with one beautiful inversion. Real sanctity is usually bought with time; a cathedral's authority is eight hundred years of accumulation, which is why new religions in prefab buildings always feel faintly fraudulent, and why Aum's compounds were, tellingly, just sheds with the windows managed. Techno squatted the ruins of the twentieth century. A power station, a bank vault, a factory floor. Spaces that arrive pre-loaded with eighty years of gravity. The ceiling height at Berghain is not a set. That's the one line on the checklist where the club didn't imitate the cult. It outbid it.

The Two Empty Slots

So is the club a cult? No. And the two ways it isn't are the most precise definition of "cult" I know.

Scholars largely dropped the word "cult" because no doctrinal test could separate a cult from a religion; every creed sounds strange from outside. What survived scrutiny was a behavioral measure: the cost of leaving. That's the modern frame, the high-demand group, defined not by what it believes but by what exit costs. And there, the club diverges completely. Monday morning, the doors open, and you leave. Nobody calls. Nobody shuns you. Your family was never involved. The door, the darkness, the seventy-two hours: the whole structure evaporates on contact with Monday. Free exit isn't a detail. It's the load-bearing difference.

The second empty slot: there's no one at the top. Techno, at its best, has been almost doctrinally anti-guru. Masked producers, faceless collectives, no VIP room in the temple. The one chair every high-demand group must fill, the scene deliberately leaves vacant. A religion of the dance floor with an empty altar.

Then history added its punchline. In 2024, Berlin's techno culture was added to Germany's national inventory of intangible cultural heritage, by the German UNESCO Commission — the national list, not UNESCO's international one. And in 2021 the Bundestag resolved to treat clubs as cultural venues rather than mere entertainment. Which is to say: the state canonized it. This is exactly the path by which new religions become old ones. Survive long enough, grow a harmless outer congregation, and the institutions that once raided you start preserving you. In Tbilisi, when police raided the club Bassiani in 2018, thousands danced in front of parliament until a government minister apologized. A scene negotiating with state power much the way a church once did.

One refinement, because it matters. Old religions didn't survive by softening their cores. They survived by growing a costless periphery around a costly core: the Christmas-only churchgoer orbiting the monastery. The club reproduces that anatomy exactly. Tourists on the main floor, and the people still there Monday at noon, for whom it's closer to practice than entertainment. Periphery plus core, with free exit. It's the cult's architecture, run in safe mode.

Tokyo Coda

What we buy on a dance floor, it turns out, is the oldest product there is. Transcendence through rhythm, darkness, and other people's bodies — the technology religions spent millennia refining — with the two dangerous parts left out. No one owns the altar, and the exit is free.

That might be the most Tokyo-compatible religion I can think of.

If you want the rooms themselves, where to hear this city at 4 a.m., that's part of what Map & Tips is for. And subscribing gets you every essay like this one.

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Japan treats some of its makers like national treasures. When Hayao Miyazaki, co-founder of Studio Ghibli, retires, it's national news. Manga artists are venerated. Anime is export strategy, named in the same government papers as semiconductors. Make popular culture here, and the country celebrates you.

Contemporary art, on the other hand, tends to face more of a headwind.

The numbers back the twist. Japan is one of the largest economies on earth, and in pop culture it's one of the most successful cultural exporters of the last thirty years. Anime alone runs into the tens of billions of dollars. Its share of the global fine-art market? About seven percent — fourth in the world, and a recent improvement at that. The United States holds over forty.

So the question isn't whether Japan disrespects its makers. It plainly treasures many of them. The question is where the line falls. Pop culture inside, fine art outside. Painters, sculptors, craftspeople, contemporary artists. Those are the makers this essay follows. (Musicians live under other forces. They'll get their own essay.)

Why is the line there? Tracing it took me to eighth-century outcasts, Confucian gentlemen, and one discovery: Japan has reached the same verdict about artists twice, for opposite reasons.

The Missing Middle

First, get it right. It isn't accurate to say artists rank "low" in Japan. It's more interesting than that. At the top, the state consecrates makers: Living National Treasures, protected lineages, imperial honors. That's as high as status gets. Below it sits a wide population of practitioners.

What's thin is the middle. The contemporary artist.

Let me be honest about the data. Artists with day jobs aren't a Japanese thing. It's the global norm. Surveys in Australia, the UK, and the US all find that most working artists depend on other income. Japan's culture-agency surveys say the same. By that measure, every country looks alike.

The difference is in two places. One is infrastructure: the collector base, the mid-tier galleries, the secondary market. The plumbing that turns cultural value into income is thin here. That's how a cultural superpower ends up with a single-digit share of the world's art trade. The other is that line. Commercial success in pop culture converts to prestige. Fine art, holding neither the state's laurel nor the market's receipts, gets filed under "hobby."

Why? Because in Japan, money and art have a very unusual history. To see it, go back to when makers sat somewhere between gods and untouchables.

Sacred and Polluted

The ancestors of Japan's performing arts didn't live at the center of society. They lived at its edge. And the edge was a charged place.

Kabuki, Japan's stylized traditional theater, descends from kawaramono — "people of the dry riverbed," a name that placed them among the outcast classes. Noh, the classical masked drama, grew from sarugaku, the earlier performing art attached to temples and shrines. Wandering performers, puppeteers, dancers. People who lived outside the settled, farming order, and that outsideness cut both ways. In a worldview where blood, death, and rootlessness all stained, they were kegare, polluted. They were also conduits. Because they stood outside the village, they stood closest to the gods and the dead.

The historian Amino Yoshihiko showed that Japan's non-agricultural people weren't simply "low." They were muen, unattached, and that detachment was a kind of privilege: they answered to shrines, temples, sometimes the emperor, not the local order. The anthropologist Yamaguchi Masao put it structurally: the periphery is where a culture stores what it fears and what it worships, and those are usually the same thing. The performer stood outside the village, so the performer stood closest to the gods. Impurity and sanctity shared one address.

Now the honest part, because this is where the easy version overreaches. This "sacred and polluted" story is mainly about performers. The makers who appear on a stage, who show with the body. The people who painted, sculpted, and threw pots sat elsewhere. Buddhist sculptors belonged to temples and could receive clerical ranks. The Kanō school served the shogunate as official painters, at high status. The Tosa school served the court. Visual makers had a different, often higher, structure.

So why do painters and sculptors get pulled into the same verdict later? Because the line sorting makers was never "making," and never caste. It was money. And that measure was shared across East Asia.

The East Asian Test

If "art equals pollution" were the deep East Asian rule, China should show it most. Instead China shows the opposite. For the scholar-officials who ran the empire, the arts were mandatory. A gentleman was expected to master four accomplishments — qin (a zither), qi (the board game go), shu (calligraphy), and hua (painting). Literati painting, the kind a scholar made as a pastime, sat at the summit of prestige. Korea's yangban aristocracy agreed: a gentleman's calligraphy and poetry ranked among the highest attainments, while the professional entertainer — the kwangdae — ranked at the bottom. In China, actors were legally debased, and their sons were barred from the civil-service exams that were the only path to office.

Look closely. It isn't "art is low." It's this:

Art as selfless cultivation, supreme. Art as paid work, polluted.

And this measure ran straight through the visual arts. Literati painting, made as a pastime, sat at the top. The professional painter working on commission ranked below. The same picture lost rank the moment money entered. Edo Japan shared it: the bunjin amateur ideal ranked high, the town painter filling commissions ranked lower. The line through visual makers was this same money line. So a painter or sculptor, whatever their caste, could land on the same side of it as the actor.

The zither-playing scholar and the stage actor might perform on the same night. What separated them wasn't skill. It was money. The gentleman played for nothing, and the nothing was the point: his art proved he was above need. The actor played to eat, and eating became the stain.

This was the old East Asian consensus, and pre-modern Japan shared it. What defiled art wasn't making it, but making a living from it. The purest art was the art money never touched.

Where Did the Sign Flip?

Now the present. The sign flipped. For centuries, money polluted art. Now proof of value leans on whether it sold, and a practice that hasn't made money yet has its verdict held in reserve. Opposite measures, same result: the working artist lands outside the norm under either one.

When did it flip? Two candidates.

One is the postwar settlement. Defeat in 1945 rebuilt the hierarchy of virtue around the company. Stable employment became the definition of adulthood, the salaryman the model of a serious person. In that order, a freelance life reads as precarious, and a freelance life given to something as market-shy as art reads as doubly unserious. Materialism didn't make Japan dislike art. It redefined seriousness as steady income, and art fell outside the new test.

The other starts earlier, in Meiji. The 1870s state imported the very concept of "fine art." Bijutsu is a translated word, coined for the international expositions. Academies, official exhibitions, and the Western idea of the professional artist came with it. At the same time, prestige was flowing elsewhere. Risshin shusse, rising in the world, meant government or industry. The gentleman-amateur ideal quietly exited. The new official channels could canonize only a few. Everyone else became, for the first time, a professional artist in a country whose measure of success had just become salary and rank.

Postwar materialism, or Meiji careerism? Where exactly the sign flipped, I don't think there's a precise answer yet.

The Paradox of the Missing Middle

So far this reads as a story of absence. A thin market, a missing tier, a flipped measure. Here's the part that doesn't fit. And it's the reason this publication exists.

Walk through Tokyo with your eyes open and the middle is everywhere. It just isn't organized as a career ladder. It's organized as an ecosystem. And it's the densest, most chaotically connected one I've seen in any city. The ceramicist who designs for a fashion label. The painter whose day job is in IT and whose openings happen in a bar the size of a bedroom. Scenes with loose borders that ignore them constantly. Craft into contemporary art, into design, into whatever happens in that basement on the third Friday.

I've come to think this vitality happens because of the structures this essay describes, not despite them. Three mechanisms.

The market built no middle rung, so artists built their own, sideways. In New York or London, surviving as a mid-tier artist means professionalizing in the market's terms: gallery representation, grant language, a legible genre, a ladder to climb. The scene stratifies the way the market does. Tokyo's makers, working in the long tradition of dual practice, answer to no such ladder. Nobody's rent depends on being easy to categorize. So nobody bothers.

The periphery never got a center. Japanese art history never consolidated into one sanctioned hierarchy with one gate. Weak gates mean weak queues. Scenes connect laterally, periphery to periphery, because lateral was the only direction ever really open.

And nobody captured it. Mark Fisher described how contemporary capitalism "pre-corporates" undergrounds, absorbing and formatting them before they finish becoming themselves. Tokyo's art ecology escaped that for an unglamorous reason: the capture apparatus decided it wasn't worth the trouble. Low cultural budgets, modest market value. The same indifference left it free to organize on its own terms.

One caution, because this can slide into romanticizing other people's hardship. The freedom of this garden is subsidized by real costs. Burnout, quiet exits, beloved spaces that close because passion was the only revenue. The chaos is glorious, and it is paid for, mostly by the artists themselves. Both are true, and an honest tour says so.

But the conclusion turns the grievance over. The flipped measure thinned the market. And outside the fence, artists built the most interesting creative ecology on earth with their own hands. That ecology — its crossings, collisions, and unmapped rooms — is what Tokyo Art Music Culture wants to guide you through.

The Objection

There's an obvious objection to all of this. Tokyo Art Music Culture also gives artists marketing methods for earning independently. So: if the scene's freedom comes from being uncaptured by the market, doesn't helping artists earn threaten the very thing worth guiding people through?

I don't think so. The whole question turns on one distinction: what tames a scene was never money. It's middlemen with taste requirements.

What stratifies an art scene isn't income. It's that income arrives only through intermediaries: galleries, labels, platforms, grant committees. Each charged legibility as the price of entry. Be categorizable. Be consistent. Be this year's version of yourself, again. That's the discipline that formats an underground, and it rides in with the middleman, not the money.

Independent earning is different. A direct relationship between an artist and the people who value the work. Plumbing that routes the money through without the discipline. The artist keeps control, the audience relationship is theirs, and no gatekeeper's taste sits in between. That's the whole design philosophy behind what we're building for artists here.

The Garden and the Toolkit

Tokyo Art Music Culture does two things about this. First, it guides you through the garden: the essays, the map, the rooms you wouldn't find alone. Second, for the people who keep the garden alive, it's building the Artist Toolkit.

For what it's worth, I don't much like ranking things — in art or anywhere else. Everything is different, and everything has its own kind of good. I just want to support the things I love and find interesting, in my own small way, and keep looking at them for a long time.

The Toolkit is in the works. Subscribe (it's free) and I'll let you know when it's live.

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A year ago I flew to Montenegro by way of Istanbul, and the trip turned into an accidental pilgrimage.

It started in Istanbul. I was only there for a few hours, late at night on a layover — but even in that short time I kept meeting friendly cats on the street, people and cats mixing as the most natural thing in the world.

Then I reached Kotor, the walled Adriatic town folded into Montenegro's fjord-like bay. It had taken things further. Cats drape over the Venetian stonework, patrol the squares, turn up on the postcards and the souvenirs. There's literally a cat museum inside the old walls. The town treats them as descendants of the ship's cats that sailed in with centuries of Adriatic trade.

Somewhere between those two cities, an old theory of mine hardened into conviction: dogs joined the family; cats founded a religion. Once you see it, you start testing the theory in every city you visit. And every city passes.

The Theory

Why does the human relationship with cats keep drifting toward reverence, in cultures that share no religion, no history, no cuisine?

The dog's story explains itself. Over tens of thousands of years, dogs adapted to us. They read our hierarchies, learned our commands, took our jobs — herding, guarding, retrieving — and moved into the family on the family's terms. A dog wants to know its place in the pack, and the pack is us. That's why the dog became family: it joined on our rules.

The cat did something structurally different. Biologically, the housecat is barely domesticated. It's still a self-sufficient predator that could feed itself tomorrow if it chose. It came for the granary mice and stayed on its own terms: indifferent to hierarchy, unmoved by commands, affectionate at times of its own choosing. We never subordinated it, and everyone involved knows it.

And here's the mechanism I keep coming back to: worship is the posture humans take toward what they can't control but choose to keep close. Add the cat's particular effects — eyes that catch light in the dark, a silent physics-adjacent way of moving, a self-cleaning fastidiousness that reads as aristocratic — and the human nervous system does the rest. We don't own cats. We attend to them. The daily reality of a cat household is a human gently apologizing while serving food to a small indifferent god. We domesticated the dog. The cat domesticated our reverence.

The Old Faiths

This isn't a modern quirk. It's one of the oldest continuous patterns in civilization.

Ancient Egypt is the founding case, and it wasn't metaphorical worship. It was the state religion. Bastet, the cat-headed goddess, guarded home, fertility, and fortune. Herodotus reported that when a household cat died, the family shaved their eyebrows in mourning. Cats were mummified with full rites and buried in dedicated necropolises. Killing a cat, even by accident, could reportedly cost a person their life. The economics underneath were perfectly rational: Egypt was the ancient world's granary, and the animal that defended the grain from rats and snakes was defending the state itself. The first economy of grain built the first theology of cats.

Islam carried the reverence forward through affection rather than statute. The Prophet Muhammad's fondness for cats anchors a whole tradition — most famously the story that, rather than wake the cat Muezza asleep on his sleeve, he cut the sleeve off and went to prayer. Kindness to cats became threaded into everyday piety; cats may enter mosques where dogs may not. Modern Istanbul's street-cat culture — the one that ambushed me at the start of this essay, the one the documentary Kedi mapped so lovingly — is that centuries-old warmth, still running at municipal scale.

Europe supplies the dark chapter that proves the point in negative. In the medieval imagination the cat's uncanniness curdled: familiar of witches, agent of the devil, killed in great numbers during the witch-hunt centuries. The story goes that thinning the cats let the rats flourish just in time for the plague — history's tidiest parable of what happens when you drive off your pest control. Whatever the epidemiological truth, the structure is telling. Even the persecution treated the cat as a spiritual actor. Nobody burns an animal for being ordinary. Veneration and demonization are the same belief in different robes: this creature is more than it appears.

Cat Cities

Look at cities through this lens and they sort themselves. Some cities treasure their cats. Here are my most recent notes:

Kotor. The maritime case. Ship's cats came ashore with the fleets and never left; the town returned the favor with a museum, a mascot economy, and de facto freedom of the city. A port remembers who kept the grain and the rigging free of rats.

Istanbul. The city where kindness to cats became the norm. Centuries of Islamic tenderness toward cats, secularized into a whole city's default behavior: food left on ledges, cat-sized houses on corners, animals moving through mosques, bazaars, and ferries like minor officials on their rounds.

Tokyo. Animism — the belief that every natural thing has a spirit of its own. Japan keeps every layer of the faith at once. The beckoning maneki-neko (the raised-paw cat figurine that invites good fortune) in every shop window traces back to temple legend — Gōtokuji in Setagaya claims the original cat that waved a feudal lord in from a storm, and its grounds are now crowded with countless white figurines. The folklore keeps the fear layer too: the bakeneko and nekomata, cats that live too long and turn uncanny — reverence and wariness, shelved side by side. And at street level, the neighborhood-cat system — communities that collectively feed and care for their local cats — is the modern form of an old arrangement: the cat lives here; the humans look after it.

The Last Untamed Ones

So the pattern holds from Bastet to the alley behind your apartment: the one animal that never signed the contract is the one we ended up serving.

I think that's also why cats feel, right now, like a kind of relief. Everything else in a modern city has been optimized, monetized, put to work — us mostly included. The cat alone sits in the middle of it, unemployed and unbothered, looking straight through our laws, our status games, and our schedules with an expression that says silly humans. And we find it beautiful precisely because none of our machinery applies to it. The last untamed ones. Maybe that's the whole religion.

For the record: I'm not a cat person. Not a dog person either. I love both — sheep, goats, and horses too. But of all of them, the cat may be the only one I treat with something like reverence.

What's your favorite cat spot in the world — or one you'd love to visit? Tell me in the comments.

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Tokyo Art Music Cultureは原則英語で書いていますが、下記の方法で無料で日本語で読めます。

方法1：Substackアプリで自動翻訳（一番おすすめ）

Substackの公式アプリはデバイスの言語設定に合わせて記事を自動翻訳します。最初に設定さえ済ませば、以降は開くだけで日本語表示になります。

手順：

1. iOSまたはAndroidでSubstackアプリをダウンロード or ブラウザでSubstackアカウントを作成(無料)

   • iOS: App Store

   • Android: Google Play

   • 各種ブラウザ

2. デバイス自体の言語設定を日本語（第一言語）にする

   • iOS：設定 → 一般 → 言語と地域 → 「言語を追加」→ 日本語 → 第一言語に設定

   • Android：設定 → システム → 言語と入力 → 言語 → 日本語を追加 → 一番上に移動

3. Substackアプリで記事を開く → 自動で日本語表示

※ Substackにログインしなければ、自動翻訳機能は利用できません
※記事ごとに手動で翻訳を切り替えたい場合は、記事タイトル上の「翻訳済み」ボタンをタップしてください。原文に戻したい場合は同じ箇所の「翻訳」ボタンをタップすると元に戻せます。

方法2：ブラウザの翻訳機能（パソコン・スマホどちらもOK）

スマホやパソコンのブラウザに標準搭載されている翻訳機能を使う方法です。
※Substackのアカウントを作成しなくても利用できますが、翻訳のクオリティが低いため読みにくいです。方法1のSubstackの自動翻訳機能の利用を推奨します。

Chrome（デスクトップ）

1. 記事ページを開く

2. ページ内のどこかで右クリック

3. 「日本語に翻訳」を選択

   1. またはアドレスバー右端に翻訳アイコンが表示された場合はそこをクリック → 日本語を選択

Chrome（モバイル：iOS / Android）

1. 記事ページを開く

2. 英語ページの場合、画面下部に翻訳バナーが自動表示される

3. 「日本語」をタップ

Safari（iOS / iPad / Mac）

1. 記事ページを開く

2. アドレスバー左側の「あぁ」ボタン（iOS）または「ぁあ」ボタン（Mac）をタップ

3. 「日本語に翻訳」を選択

4. （初回のみ「翻訳を有効にする」の確認が出る場合あり）

Microsoft Edge（デスクトップ）

1. 記事ページを開く

2. 英語ページを開くとアドレスバー右端に翻訳アイコンが自動表示

3. アイコンをクリック → 「日本語」を選択 → 「翻訳」ボタンを押す

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Tokyo Is Not "Healthy" — And That's the Point

When people talk about Tokyo's cultural scene, they often use words like "creative," "sophisticated," and "unique." They're not wrong. But those words alone explain very little.

Tokyo's cultural energy does not come from a place that is "healthy" in the textbook sense. It is not supported by especially generous public funding, nor by a high social status for artists, nor by a system where freedom of expression is fully guaranteed. As a cultural ecosystem, it is full of flaws.

And yet—or rather, because of that—Tokyo's culture remains strangely alive. A gallery that suddenly appears on the fifth floor of a shabby multi-tenant building. A club hidden in the basement of a quiet residential neighborhood. Parties that happen only briefly and leave almost no trace online. These are not temporary trends. They persist for years, even decades, often with almost exactly the same rough texture.

Where does that persistence come from?

To understand it, we have to look not just at what kind of city Tokyo is, but at the kind of history it stands on.

Postwar Ghosts and Half-Dismantled Hierarchies

After 1945, Japan went through dramatic change. The zaibatsu were dismantled, land was reformed, and a new constitution was introduced. The power structures that had dominated the country were, at least officially, broken apart by the occupation.

But the dismantling was never complete.

The zaibatsu survived in altered form as corporate groups. In politics, prewar family lineages continued to reproduce themselves through inheritance. The bureaucratic apparatus remained largely intact, and local social hierarchies did not fundamentally disappear. In other words, Japan did not so much destroy the old order as place a new exterior on top of it.

This half-finished dismantling created a peculiar gray zone.

Outwardly, democracy. In practice, connections and inherited networks. Officially, a flat system; unofficially, hierarchy still functions. No one points to it too loudly, but everyone more or less knows it is there. This structure runs not only through the economy, but deeply through culture as well.

In Capitalist Realism, Mark Fisher described a condition in which a system that should no longer be functioning continues to survive because people feel there is no alternative—a kind of ghostly persistence, or hauntology. Japan's postwar structure is remarkably close to this. The dynamics of the prewar and wartime eras are supposed to be over, officially speaking, and yet they linger throughout society like ghosts.

And that ghost is unmistakably present in the atmosphere of Tokyo's underground scenes too.

Nepotism, Networks, and the Underground Safety Net

The word "nepotism" is usually used in a negative sense. Political corruption. Economic stagnation. Unequal opportunity. In fact, societies with strong nepotistic structures are often said to struggle with economic development, and there is no shortage of examples around the world.

Japan is a peculiar case here as well. Nepotism certainly existed, but it was also dismantled just enough to allow economic growth. It was not fully destroyed, but it was not fully preserved either. That subtle incompleteness is the key.

The same dynamic operates in the cultural sphere.

Tokyo's underground often functions through "people who know people." Information about spaces and events tends to circulate in semi-closed forms. Sometimes, new people can only enter through an introduction, or by showing up repeatedly and gradually becoming recognized.

From the outside, this can look exclusionary and closed. And it is, to some extent. It can be difficult for newcomers to enter, and internal social dynamics undeniably play a role.

But at the same time, these closed networks are also part of what has protected Tokyo's underground.

Commercial capital has a harder time entering. Major media has a harder time packaging it. Administrative oversight does not always reach it easily. This invisibility is a byproduct of nepotistic network structures, and as a result, it has functioned as a kind of safety net—shielding scenes from being fully absorbed by capital or institutional power.

Protected, and at the same time closed.

It is precisely this contradiction, held without resolution, that gives Tokyo's underground its distinctive texture.

Why Tokyo's Underground Has Stayed Raw for So Long

Think of Berlin. In the 1990s, after the fall of the Wall, former East Berlin was full of vacant buildings and ruins. Artists and clubbers moved in, and an underground scene emerged unlike almost anything else in the world. Techno, experimental music, street art. Berlin at that moment was pure rough space—gaps not yet reached by capital.

But from the 2010s onward, those gaps were rapidly filled in by gentrification. Rents rose, clubs closed, and former ruins turned into luxury apartments.

Prague, Lisbon, Tbilisi. Similar cycles have repeated in cities all over the world. Roughness is usually temporary. Eventually, it gets absorbed by capital. That is the pattern we see in many places.

Tokyo does not quite follow that pattern.

Of course, Tokyo has gentrification too. There are neighborhoods erased by redevelopment, and spaces forced to relocate because of rising rents. But even so, Tokyo's underground has remained raw for a surprisingly long time.

A quiet bar that has operated for more than ten years in a tiny room inside a worn-down building. A small club night where almost the same people gather every week. A place with no sign at all, impossible to identify from the outside, that just stays there. Why? The closed networks mentioned earlier are one reason. But there is another, more structural one.

Because of the incomplete reckoning with the postwar period, Tokyo never fully internalized the idea of clearing everything away and rebuilding from zero at the level of systems. Old buildings may be torn down, but old dynamics remain. Beneath new surfaces, older structures continue to lie in place. This quality of being only half-updated is reflected in cultural space too.

Berlin's roughness came from a time lag—capital had not arrived yet. Tokyo's roughness comes from a more permanent suspension, a structural inability to fully resolve things.

That is why Tokyo's underground does not quite end. The atmosphere of Berlin ten years ago, or Prague now, somehow keeps going in Tokyo—not as a temporary transition, but as a transition that has become strangely permanent.

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What Shapes Art, Music, and Everyday Urban Space

This ghostly persistence is not limited to underground scenes. The same structure appears throughout Tokyo's everyday spaces.

A standing bar in a back alley. A select shop inside a fifty-year-old mixed-use building. A shopping street that feels abandoned by time, appearing suddenly just one block off a major road. A party held in a convenience store.

In Tokyo, high-end spaces and rough spaces coexist at an almost absurd proximity. A Michelin three-star sushi counter can be five minutes on foot from an old bar with peeling walls. Right behind a national museum, there may be a tiny alternative space inside an aging building.

This coexistence was not planned. It emerged accidentally from the layering of incomplete postwar dismantling, lingering nepotistic networks, and rapid but partial modernization.

And it is precisely this accidental layering that makes Tokyo's art and music unlike those of any other city.

Artists do not confine themselves to museums and galleries; they use small rooms in old buildings or the street itself as sites for work. Musicians do not only play large venues; they perform in basement spaces with room for twenty people, and keep doing it for years. Culture does not converge into one "correct" place. It remains dispersed across the city, layered, and capable of appearing unexpectedly.

This multiplicity of layers—"layers" really is the most fitting word—is the core of Tokyo's culture.

What This Means for Visitors — How to Read the City

At this point, you might be thinking: this is interesting, but what does it have to do with me as a traveler?

Quite a lot.

Most people who visit Tokyo experience the surface. Famous sights, well-known food, carefully maintained tourist routes. Those are valuable experiences in themselves. But on their own, they show only one face of the city.

What makes Tokyo truly interesting lies in the different layers stacked underneath that surface. And those layers are shaped by the historical and structural conditions described above.

The important thing is not which layer is supposedly the "right" one, or the more "insider" one. High-end sushi and a standing bar in a back alley, a national museum and a gallery in a worn-down building, a major festival and an underground party—all of them are equally cultural signs of this city. None is inherently above or below another.

What matters is which signs you respond to.

If you can begin to see through the city's structure even a little—if you can sense why a place exists where it does, why an atmosphere feels the way it does, what keeps a scene in its current form—your experience of Tokyo changes dramatically in resolution.

It stops being mere sightseeing. It becomes an experience of reading the city.

Living With Disorder, Flexibly

Some people will want to solve this structure as a problem. Break nepotism. Make everything more open. Make systems transparent. Fair enough.

But I want to pause there.

If complete health, openness, and transparency are the goal, then Tokyo's peculiar cultural energy would probably disappear with them. Just as Berlin has been losing the feeling of "that old Berlin" through gentrification, fully organizing this structure would likely erase the accidental qualities it produces.

That does not mean I want to simply celebrate the gray zone as it is. Closed systems have their problems. Nepotism does real harm.

But what makes Tokyo interesting is that people continue to produce culture within this disorder—sometimes unconsciously, sometimes strategically, but always with a certain flexibility. Unresolved, suspended, and still moving.

Tokyo's culture keeps emerging not from places that have been resolved, but from places that remain unresolved.

To understand that unresolved vitality—and to find your own sense of what you love within it—that, I think, is one of the richest ways to encounter this city.

I've lived in Tokyo for over a decade, walking the city through a socio-cultural lens. From major museums to underground parties, I create resources for experiencing Tokyo's layered culture through the axis of what you genuinely respond to.

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